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 I. INTRODUCTION 
 Over the past several decades, the federal procurement system in the United 
States has grown remarkably, and now totals over $500 billion annually. 1 Over 
that same period, the rules governing federal procurement have been buffeted 
by broad efforts at reform. At no point, however, have we ever had an over-
arching theory—a model or prism—through which to assess the procurement 
system or its reform. Agency theory provides one such  theoretical model. Long 
established in economics and the other social sciences, 2 the principal-agent 
model (agency theory) provides a model to explain successes (and  failures) in 
Associate Professor of Government Contract Law and Co-Director, Government Procure-
ment Law Program, The George Washington University Law School.
1. See, e.g., Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Dep’ts and Agencies (Mar. 4, 2009), avail-
able at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_offi ce/Memorandum-for-the-Heads-of-Executive-
Departments-and-Agencies-Subject-Government/.
2. See, e.g., Oliver Hart, An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1757, 1758–60 (1989) (discussing development of the principal-agent approach); Jon D. 
Michaels, Privatization’s Pretensions, 77 U. Chi. L. Rev. 717 (2010) (application of principal-agent 
theory in procurement); Richard W. Waterman & Kenneth J. Meier, Principal-Agent Models: An 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1776295
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organizational structures, and also to understand the procurement system and 
its rules. 3 
 The theory builds upon the classic principal-agent model. A  principal en-
lists an  agent to carry out the principal’s goals, presumably because the agent 
enjoys some comparative advantage in performing the goals. 4 Inevitably, how-
ever, the agent’s interests diverge from the principal’s; if the agent’s goals di-
verge suffi ciently, the agent may be said to have a  confl ict of interest . 5 Notably, 
the risk that such a confl ict (such a divergence in goals) will be material—will 
impair the principal 6 —increases when an  asymmetry of information tilts in the 
agent’s favor, i.e., in those situations where the agent holds much more infor-
mation than the principal, or when a particularly robust “moral hazard” 7 lures 
the agent from the principal’s ends. 8 
Expansion?, 8 J. Pub. Admin. Res. & Theory 173, 177–78 (1998); see also Øyvind Bøhren, The 
Agent’s Ethics in the Principal-Agent Model, 17 J. Bus. Ethics 745, 745–46 (1998) (surveying litera-
ture); Thomas D. Jeitschko & Leonard J. Mirman, Information and Experimentation in Short-Term 
Contracting, 19 Econ. Theory 311, 316–18 (2002) (discussing theoretical model for renegotiation 
of principal-agent agreement). There are, of course, extensive precedents in public procurement 
law on the relationship between the Government and its agents. See, e.g., Brunner v. United 
States, 70 Fed. Cl. 623, 629 (2006) (discussing lines of legal precedent regarding agents’ author-
ity to act on behalf of Government). While there are overlaps between those precedents and our 
discussion here, our focus here is not on defi ning the limits on agents’ authority—the classic issue 
in agency law—but rather on understanding how the Government, as the procuring principal, 
should approach the issue of controlling its various agents and sub-agents in the supply chain.
3. The discussion here draws in part upon an unpublished paper the author presented at the 
International Public Procurement Conference in 2008. See Christopher R. Yukins, Addressing 
Confl icts of Interest in Procurement: First Steps on the World Stage, Following the U.N. 
Convention Against Corruption 1196–2001 (Aug. 28–30, 2008) (unpublished paper) (on fi le at 
http://www.ippa.ws/IPPC3/Proceedings/Chaper%2061.pdf ).
4. See, e.g., Michael G. Jacobides & David C. Croson, Information Policy: Shaping the Value of 
Agency Relationships, 26 Acad. Mgmt. Rev. 202, 203 (2001).
5. As is discussed below, not all technical “confl icts” are actionable; where a society draws the 
line can depend on many variables. Professor Bradley Wendel lamented the somewhat arbitrary 
line between what is permissible and what is not:
It can be diffi cult to rationalize distinctions drawn between impermissible and permissible 
interests of the agent. In Stark’s terms, the conceptual challenge is to survey the fi eld of inter-
ests [sic] and pick out those which are “encumbering” in the sense of creating a normatively 
signifi cant infl uence on the agent’s judgment. The question of how we distinguish encumber-
ing interests from innocuous ones is just as contestable as the discretionary judgment that we 
entrust to agents, however, which is what gives rise to worries about confl icts of interest in the 
fi rst place.
W. Bradley Wendel, The Deep Structure of Confl icts of Interest, 16 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 473, 485 
(2003) (reviewing Andrew Stark, Confl ict of Interest in American Public Life (2000) & 
Confl ict of Interest in the Professions (Michael Davis & Andrew Stark eds., 2001)).
6. One useful conceptual device is to consider the “principal” to be the public interest. See 
Waterman & Meier, supra note 2, at 174–75. The question of how to identify the “principal” is 
discussed further below. See infra notes 12–17 and accompanying text.
7. See generally David P. Baron & David Besanko, Monitoring of Performance in Organizational 
Contracting: The Case of Defense Procurement, 90 Scandanavian J. Econ. 329 (1988), for an at-
tempt to model the factors at play in effective defense contracting, including the moral hazard 
that the contractor may lack true incentives to hold down costs.
8. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review, 14 Acad. Mgmt. 
Rev. 57, 57–70 (1989) (discussing information asymmetry as increasing likelihood of agent’s 
diversion from the principal’s goals, and moral hazard issues). As Kathleen Eisenhardt noted, 
“[W]hen principals and agents engage in a long-term relationship, it is likely that the principal 
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 To mitigate that confl ict of interest—to keep the agent aligned with the 
principal’s goals—the principal relies upon supervisory strategies sometimes 
known as  monitoring and  bonding .  Monitoring is what it sounds like: it is the 
principal’s efforts to monitor what the agent is doing, to ensure that the agent 
pursues the principal’s ends. 9  Bonding , in contrast, was classically understood 
will learn about the agent . . . and so will be able to assess behavior more readily. Conversely, 
in short-term agency relationships, the information asymmetry between principal and agent is 
likely to be greater,” and so more precautions must be taken to ensure the principal’s ends are 
met. Id. at 62. In procurement, this nuance in agency theory may explain why procuring offi cials 
tend to favor established contractors with long relationships with the Government; that long 
familiarity, as Eisenhardt explained, reduces the risks that a contractor’s informational advantage 
(the information asymmetry) might otherwise bring to the government-contractor relationship. 
Id. at 62–63.
9. Sharon Hannes described monitoring and bonding as follows:
Under agency theory, whenever one person, the agent . . . is required to fulfi ll a task for an-
other person, the principal . . . a confl ict of interest emerges. This confl ict means the agent may 
pursue her own agenda rather than actions optimal in fulfi lling her task for the principal. As a 
result, goes the argument, the principal-agent setting entails three types of costs. The fi rst type 
is monitoring costs. Since the agent is prone to deviate from the goals set for her, the principal 
must employ expensive means to verify what her agent is doing and, if necessary, call her to 
order . . . .
The second inevitable type of cost is bonding costs. Bonding measures do not assist the principal 
in scrutinizing and governing the actions of the agent, but, rather, are intended to ensure that 
the agent sticks to the objectives of her employment. Hence, a public servant is often re-
quired to cut any ties he may have with the business community to ensure objectivity; fi -
nancial reporters or advisors are required to refrain from personal investments to prevent 
skewed recommendations; and workers go to much trouble to bring references and pursue 
studies, which, at least in part, are efforts aimed at showing how devoted they are going to 
be to their jobs.
Finally, even after monitoring and bonding costs, there is a residual loss to be borne. This 
means there is always enough room for a confl ict of interest to arise between the principal 
and agent. For example, a certain amount of theft by workers always occurs; some confi den-
tial information will always leak; and employee effort levels rarely meet those of owners. In 
fact, as long as the residual losses are lower than the cost of additional bonding or moni-
toring costs required to overcome them, it is effi cient to incur these losses.
Sharon Hannes, Reverse Monitoring: On the Hidden Role of Employee Stock-Based Compensation, 105 
Mich. L. Rev. 1421, 1438–39 (2007) (emphasis added). Hannes’ descriptions drew on the land-
mark 1976 paper by Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976), which has framed 
decades of discussions that followed regarding the principal-agent model. A revised version of 
that paper states:
If both parties to the relationship are utility maximizers, there is good reason to believe that 
the agent will not always act in the best interests of the principal. The principal can limit diver-
gences from his interest by establishing appropriate incentives for the agent and by incurring 
monitoring costs designed to limit the aberrant activities of the agent. In addition in some 
situations it will pay the agent to expend resources (bonding costs) to guarantee that he will 
not take certain actions which would harm the principal or to ensure that the principal will be 
compensated if he does take such actions. However, it is generally impossible for the principal 
or the agent at zero cost to ensure that the agent will make optimal decisions from the prin-
cipal’s viewpoint. In most agency relationships the principal and the agent will incur positive 
monitoring and bonding costs (non-pecuniary as well as pecuniary), and in addition there will 
be some divergence between the agent’s decisions and those decisions which would maximize 
the welfare of the principal. The dollar equivalent of the reduction in welfare experienced by 
the principal as a result of this divergence is also a cost of the agency relationship, and we refer 
to this latter cost as the “residual loss.”
Id., available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=94043 (manuscript at 5).
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in agency theory to refer to voluntary, largely contractual self-constraints on 
the agent’s discretion. 10 For our purposes in the procurement realm, though, 
 bonding might be better termed “sanctions” or “punishment”: the agent bonds 
itself to follow the principal’s ends, and if the agent strays, the agent must 
forfeit that bond in some sort of sanction—whether that means suffering a 
contractual penalty, or a civil liability, or forfeiting the agent’s liberty and 
going to prison. 
 Agency theory concludes that there is always “residual loss” in any principal-
agent relationship—some immutable, residual deviation by the agent from the 
principal’s ends that cannot be erased through monitoring or bonding. 11 That 
residual loss might, on its face, suggest that using an agent is  always a losing 
proposition—or, put in the language of procurement, that no function should 
ever be contracted out. The intuitive illogic of that extreme solution points 
out the other costs (the opportunity costs of not engaging a highly qualifi ed 
agent, for example) that also must be considered when weighing the costs and 
benefi ts of using an agent. 
 II. APPLYING AGENCY THEORY TO PROCUREMENT LAW 
 Applying this principal-agent model 12 to procurement is, on its face, rel-
atively straightforward, 13 and indeed the social science literature includes a 
10. See, e.g., Hannes, supra note 9, at 1439.
11. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 9, at 5.
12. In a passage of extraordinary prescience, Jensen and Meckling themselves anticipated the 
broad potential applications of principal-agent theory:
Before moving on, however, it is worthwhile to point out the generality of the agency prob-
lem. The problem of inducing an “agent” to behave as if he were maximizing the “principal’s” 
welfare is quite general. It exists in all organizations and in all cooperative efforts—at every 
level of management in fi rms, in universities, in mutual companies, in cooperatives, in govern-
mental authorities and bureaus, in unions, and in relationships normally classifi ed as agency 
relationships such as those common in the performing arts and the market for real estate. The 
development of theories to explain the form which agency costs take in each of these situations 
(where the contractual relations differ signifi cantly), and how and why they are born will lead 
to a rich theory of organizations which is now lacking in economics and the social sciences 
generally.
Id. at 6–7.
13. Ohad Soudry describes the principal-agent problem in procurement as follows:
[I]n the absence of effective control mechanisms, procurement offi cials are likely to involve 
some personal preferences, derived from their private interests, career prospects, social con-
tacts, monetary reward or merely an aversion to effort, when making procurement decisions. 
In the terms of the principal-agent terminology used above, a lack of accountability means that 
the (procurement) agent is more likely to engage in a low level rather than a high level of effort 
when performing his tasks. The challenge faced by public procurement regulators therefore, 
is to ensure that the agency costs which rise when procurement agents carry out tasks for the 
benefi t of their principal, do not exceed the benefi t derived from such a delegation of decision-
making authority.
Ohad Soudry, A Principal-Agent Analysis of Accountability in Public Procurement, in Advancing 
Public Procurement: Practices, Innovation and Knowledge 432, 435 (Gustavo Piga & Khi V. 
Thai, eds., 2007).
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number of applications of agency theory to procurement. 14 Under this 
model, the procuring offi cial may be said to act as an agent for a principal 
(or principals). That  principal may shift from one political culture to another. 
In the United States, “taxpayers,” the executive, or Congress may variously 
be viewed as the principal; while in a monarchy, the king may be consid-
ered the principal. 15 In acting on behalf of that principal (however defi ned), 
the procuring offi cial (the “agent”) may have goals that diverge from those 
of the principal. That confl ict of interest must be tempered by monitoring 
(the oversight natural to any procurement system) 16 and bonding (the various 
forms of sanctions typical in a procurement system when the agent/offi cial is 
diverted by his own interests). 17 The more sophisticated the agent/offi cial in 
relation to the principal (the king, the parliament, etc.), the more likely there 
is an  asymmetry of information , and therefore, the more acute the need for 
principal-agent controls. 
 The principal-agent model can be extended to encompass the contractor 
in procurement. If the sovereign (or his surrogate) is the  principal , and the 
contracting offi cial is an  agent , logically then the contractor retained by the 
14. See, e.g., Thomas D. Jeitschko et al., The Simple Analytics of Information and Experimentation 
in Dynamic Agency, 19 Econ. Theory 549, 549–551 (2002); Rosella Levaggi, Optimal Procurement 
Contracts Under a Binding Budget Constraint, 101 Pub. Choice 23, 23–25 (1999) (discussing pres-
sures on principal to purchase agent’s information where agent bears no potential liability); Eric 
Maskin & Jean Tirole, The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common 
Values, 60 Econometrica 1, 2 (1992) (game theory testing assumptions regarding an informed 
principal, citing Department of Defense as an example of informed principal that may not share 
private information regarding true value of weapons system); see generally R. Preston McAfee & 
John McMillan, Bidding for Contracts: A Principal-Agent Analysis, 17 RAND J. Econ. 326 (1986); 
Dilip Mookherjee & Masatoshi Tsumagari, The Organization of Supplier Networks: Effects of 
Delegation and Intermediation, 72 Econometrica 1179 (2004) (using principal-agent modeling 
to assess principals’ optimal strategies for responding to agents’ collusion by using purchasing 
intermediaries); Stefan Reichelstein, Constructing Incentive Schemes for Government Contracts: An 
Application of Agency Theory, 67 Acct. Rev. 712 (1992) (agency theory used to design incentive 
contracts used by German ministry).
15. See generally Waterman & Meier, supra note 2, at 178–79 (discussing multiple principals).
16. In their seminal work on the principal-agent model, Jensen and Meckling also touched 
on incentives to ensure that the agent acts in the principal’s interest. See Jensen & Meckling, 
supra note 9, at 7. Applied to the world of procurement, those types of incentives to ensure op-
timal acquisition decisions—typically performance incentives for contract managers or support-
ing contractors—generally fall outside the realm of procurement law. Those incentives are not, 
therefore, extensively addressed here.
17. A few words here on “bonding,” a basic element of the principal-agent model. Jensen and 
Meckling said that “bonding” (in contrast to “monitoring”) “would take such forms as contrac-
tual guarantees to have the fi nancial accounts audited by a public accountant, explicit bonding 
against malfeasance on the part of the manager, and contractual limitations on the manager’s 
decision-making power (which impose costs on the fi rm because they limit his ability to take full 
advantage of some profi table opportunities as well as limiting his ability to harm the stockholders 
while making himself better off ).” Id. at 29. Their examples of bonding were naturally bounded 
by the focus of their paper, i.e., on organizational structures within a fi rm. Here, in contrast, the 
author uses “bonding” in a broader sense, to include (among other things) legal sanctions, to 
capture the wider range of “bonding” (of affi rmative curbs on agents’ behavior) that may come 
into play in a complex public procurement system.
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contracting offi cial is a  subagent . 18 And much as the distracted contracting 
offi cial may fail to act in accordance with the principal’s goals, to the extent 
that offi cial (agent) in turn vests the contractor (subagent) with authority, the 
enterprise may be diverted by the contractor’s (subagent’s) own confl icts of 
interest. The  asymmetries of information between the principal, the agent (of-
fi cial), and the subagent (contractor) again only sharpen the risk the contrac-
tor will be able to abuse the situation to further his own ends, and not the 
principal’s—as will be discussed further below. 
 III. THE KEY  DESIDERATA ILLUMINATED BY AGENCY THEORY 
 The challenge, then, is to integrate the conceptual structure offered by 
agency theory with existing and accepted norms in the procurement system. 
In a groundbreaking 2002 article, Professor Steven Schooner described im-
portant elements of any successful procurement system—the “desiderata.” 19 
Of those, the three key qualities are competition, integrity, and transparency. 20 
Each of those qualities, and several other  desiderata , including effi ciency, unifor-
mity, customer satisfaction, best value, and risk avoidance, are assessed below 
through the prism of the principal-agent model. 21 
 A. Competition 
 The principal-agent model may provide its most important insights re-
garding  competition —which is unsurprising because it is, at bottom, an eco-
nomic model. Ironically, though, the agency model is particularly useful 
because it illustrates why  other economic models fall short when applied to 
procurement. For example, while competitive procurement through an in-
termediary (or a “lead systems integrator,” as an intermediary may be known) 
makes sense as a simple economic model—the government/principal reduces 
18. See Kenneth R. Mayer & Anne M. Khademian, Bringing Politics Back in: Defense Policy and 
the Theoretical Study of Institutions and Processes, 56 Pub. Admin. Rev. 180, 184 (1996). In applying 
agency theory to the process of defense procurement, Mayer and Khademian wrote:
Public managers are the agents in a chain of accountability that begins with congressional 
delegation of authority and extends through intermediaries (the executive branch and struc-
tures within the Department of Defense [DOD]) who, depending on context, act sometimes 
as principals and other times as agents. At each stage, the key analytical task is to identify what 
the principals want from their agents and then explain why certain types of control structures 
emerge. The issue is control: who, as principal, has the authority to decide what the bureau-
cracy (the agent) will do, and how does the principal monitor and control behavior to deter-
mine if, and insure that, the agent is acting in accordance with his or her wishes?
Id.
19. Steven L. Schooner, Desiderata: Objectives for a System of Government Contract Law, 2002 
Pub. Procurement L. Rev. 103 (2002).
20. Id. at 104.
21. Cf. Shane Greenstein, Procedural Rules and Procurement Regulations: Complexity Creates 
Trade-offs, 9 J.L. Econ. & Org. 159, 164–66 (1993) (assessing the goals of integrity, best value, 
and fairness in the procurement system, in light of demands of the principal-agent model).
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transaction costs, and gains the intermediary’s informational advantages as 
leverage against a highly sophisticated marketplace—agency theory explains 
why, in practice, using a “procurement intermediary” has proven so diffi cult. 
Agency theory explains that because the intermediary may, in fact, badly dis-
tort the principal’s ends because of differing interests, the marginal benefi ts 
of retaining an intermediary (the lead systems integrator) often outweigh the 
costs (the control costs, the risks, and the potential opportunity costs) caused 
by interposing an intermediary between the principal (the Government) and 
the ultimate supplier. 22 
 B. Transparency 
 The principal-agent model also lends new perspectives on  transparency , long 
a central theme in procurement reform. 23 Transparency in procurement—
primarily the publicizing of information on contract opportunities and 
awards—has traditionally been assessed from the perspectives of key stake-
holders 24 such as competing contractors, taxpayers, or the press. As a result, 
marginal improvements in transparency are assessed for the benefi ts they 
would afford those stakeholders. Highly quantitative studies in agency theory 
provide, however, other perspectives on transparency—including, for example, 
whether theoretically the principal can ensure better outcomes from an agent 
if the agent is afforded more complete information on the agent’s own perfor-
mance. 25 These new perspectives, backed by quantitative assessments, could 
bring important new dimensions to policy debates about the marginal value of 
additional transparency. 
22. See Mookherjee & Tsumagari, supra note 14, at 1199–2000 (“Retaining control with re-
gard to contracting with every relevant agent in the organization enables the Principal to limit 
problems of double marginalization of rents inherent in vertical side contracting relationships 
among agents . . . . Only in certain circumstances can delegation be justifi ed (e.g., when authority 
is delegated to a well-informed intermediary and the inputs supplied are complementary). The 
theory thus predicts circumstances (defi ned by complementarity or substitutability of activities, 
and dispersion of information among agents) where delegation arrangements are likely to be 
more prevalent.”).
23. One recent initiative in transparency is a proposal to put all federal contracts online. 
See Enhancing Contract Transparency, 75 Fed. Reg. 26,916 (proposed May 13, 2010) (to be 
codifi ed at 48 C.F.R. pt. 24); Tom Spoth, Posting All Fed Contracts Online Alarms Contractors, 
Fed. Times, May 31, 2010, at 1, available at http://www.federaltimes.com/article/20100530/
ACQUISITION03/5300308/.
24. A word is warranted here on “stakeholders.” In theories of a private fi rm, there is a tension 
between, on the one hand, the principal-agent theory that holds that principals must direct and 
control the various agents of the fi rm and, on the other, the “stakeholder” theory, which would 
take broader account of stakeholders’ interests in the private fi rm’s affairs. See, e.g., John Kong 
Shan Ho, Economics of the Firm versus Stakeholder Theory: Is There a Governance Dilemma?, 38 
H.K.L.J. 399, 399 (2008). In the broader context of public procurement, however, these divisions 
and that tension largely dissipate. Stakeholders (e.g., legislators, taxpayers, or contractors) can 
themselves quite suddenly become principals and agents with a direct hand in the supply chain. 
Indeed, these shifting roles help make policymaking in this area challenging and dynamic.
25. See, e.g., Stanley Baiman & Konduru Sivaramakrishnan, The Value of Private Pre-Decision 
Information in a Principal-Agent Context, 66 Acct. Rev. 747, 747–48 (1991); Jacobides & Croson, 
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 C. Integrity and Corruption 
 The principal-agent model lends new clarity to concerns about  integrity 
and  corruption . 26 Some might argue, for example, that on its face the anticor-
ruption regime in U.S. federal procurement law is overly cumbersome and in-
effi cient because, beyond normal antibribery provisions, 27 a vast array of lesser 
anticorruption rules 28 impose additional constraints on procurement offi cials 
to discourage gratuities, constrain “revolving door” contacts, and bar the 
distribution of sensitive information. Agency theory suggests, however, that 
those additional constraints are necessary 29 because as the chain of authority 
stretches from principal to agent to subagent, the risk that the procurement 
actions will be diverted from the principal’s goals rises dramatically, 30 and so 
there must be special legal controls to dampen the corrupt confl icts of interest 
that could otherwise arise. 
 More broadly, by applying the principal-agent model, we can see that the 
extensive oversight mechanisms in the U.S. system refl ect “monitoring” and 
supra note 4, at 204–05 (discussing how advances in information technology have reduced prin-
cipals’ monitoring problem).
26. See, for example, the clear line that Susan Rose-Ackerman draws between agency theory 
and public corruption:
Corruption occurs where private wealth and public power overlap. It represents the illicit use 
of willingness-to-pay as a decision-making criterion. Frequently, bribes induce offi cials to take 
actions that are against the interests of their principals, who may be bureaucratic superiors, 
politically appointed ministers, or multiple principals such as the general public. Pathologies 
in the agency/principal relation are at the heart of the corrupt transaction.
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government, 15 Int’l Peacekeeping 328, 330 (2008).
27. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2006).
28. The anticorruption rules include The Procurement Integrity Act, 41 U.S.C. § 423 (2006), 
implemented through FAR 3.104.
29. Cf. Yeon-Koo Che, Revolving Doors and the Optimal Tolerance for Agency Collusion, 26 
RAND J. Econ. 378, 378 (1995) (arguing that the prospect of a revolving door into industry 
may, in some cases, actually enhance public offi cials’ oversight of industry).
30. Roberto Burguet and Yeon-Koo Che discussed the failures in integrity that may arise when 
we interpose an agent between the buyer (principal) and the vendors:
Corruption would never be an issue if the buyer could procure directly without leaving any 
discretion to a third party. Delegation is often inevitable, however, since evaluating proposals 
requires special expertise that the buyer may not possess. Often, the procured goods and ser-
vices involve new technologies and/or nonstandard designs, which are diffi cult to objectively 
measure or evaluate . . . .
This need for relying on a third-party assessment of contract proposals creates a potential 
for bribery and corruption. For instance, a procurement offi cer in charge of assessing proposals 
can manipulate her evaluation to “steer” the contract to a bribing company. To some extent, 
such manipulation can be accomplished without even creating suspicion of impropriety, since 
evaluating new, untested technologies can be subjective.
Roberto Burguet & Yeon-Koo Che, Competitive Procurement with Corruption, 35 RAND J. Econ. 
50, 51 (2004). While the authors’ starting point may be questionable, it is equally likely that a 
“buyer” (typically a program offi cial in federal procurement) will be as susceptible to bribery as 
a third party. Burguet and Che make clear that the layers of agents/intermediaries add risks of 
corruption. See generally id.
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“bonding,” undertaken in order to align procurement (the actual purchas-
ing of goods and services) with the “principal’s” (or “the public’s”) interests. 
Again applying the model, we can see that an active press provides low-cost 
monitoring (and thus reduces risk), much as whistleblowers serve as surrogate 
monitors and enforcers of the principal’s interest. 31 Bid protests, under this 
model, are arguably another means of monitoring and bonding—of forcing 
procurement offi cials to adhere closely to the principal’s goals, as defi ned by 
the procurement rules, including the confl ict-of-interest rules. 32 Extending 
the agency model, fraud actions brought by whistleblowers under the False 
Claims Act 33 are arguably stopgap solutions to enforce monitoring and bond-
ing on the principal’s behalf 34 where contracting offi cials have failed to detect 
fraud or malfeasance. Finally, under this model, those who admonish procur-
ing offi cials to follow the rules, including those in the “accountability” com-
munity (auditors, lawyers, courts, and the Government Accountability Offi ce) 
are merely reinforcing that same monitoring role. 35 
 D. Effi ciency 
 In his 2002 piece, Steven Schooner identifi ed the need for “effi ciency” in 
procurement, which he defi ned as another  desideratum . 36 A procurement sys-
tem, he argues, “is effi cient when it spends the least amount of resources in the 
31. See, e.g., William E. Kovacic, Whistleblower Bounty Lawsuits as Monitoring Devices in 
Government Contracting, 29 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1799, 1808–09 (1996).
32. See, e.g., Robert M. Hansen, CICA Without Enforcement: How Procurement Offi cials and 
Federal Court Decisions Are Undercutting Enforcement Provisions of the Competition in Contracting Act, 
6 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 131, 140–44 (1997); see also Greenstein, supra note 21, at 159 (“Procedural 
rules stack the deck in favor of desired outcomes, yet permit future decision-makers to adapt to 
new facts and contingencies. Rules relegate monitoring responsibility to the parties that have an 
interest in a specifi c agency decision. This process sets up guidelines for all decision-makers to 
follow. When guidelines are not followed, the principal has a simple and signifi cant signal that 
more interventionist oversight is required.”); Robert C. Marshall et al., Curbing Agency Problems in 
the Procurement Process by Protest Oversight, 25 RAND J. Econ. 297 (1994) (assessing strengths and 
weaknesses of the bid protest (challenge) process as a solution for principal-agent problems in pro-
curement); Xinglin Zhang, Supplier Review as a Mechanism for Securing Compliance with Government 
Public Procurement Rules: A Critical Perspective, 16 Pub. Procurement L. Rev. 325, 326–28 (2007).
33. See generally John T. Boese, Civil False Claims and Qui Tam Actions (2006); William E. 
Kovacic, The Civil False Claims Act as a Deterrent to Participation in Government Procurement 
Markets, 6 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 201 (1998).
34. Indeed, third-party whistleblowers bring suit under the False Claims Act’s “qui tam” pro-
visions, derived from the Latin phrase “qui tam pro domino rege quam se ipso in hac parte 
sequitur,” meaning “who pursues this action on the King’s behalf as well as his own.” See, e.g., Vt. 
Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 768 & n.1 (2000).
35. The economic literature offers a unique reverse perspective on those charged with ensur-
ing accountability—those who, in the studies describing the principal-agent model, are called 
“supervisors” of the agents. A supervisor normally oversees the agent on the principal’s behalf. 
The literature points out that if the supervisor and the agent collude and thus allow the agent to 
diverge from the principal’s aims, the effect—a result that diverges sharply from the principal’s 
goals—is, at least on its face, the same result that might obtain were a bribe given to the agent. 
See, e.g., Roland Strausz, Collusion and Renegotiation in a Principal-Supervisor-Agent Relationship, 99 
Scandinavian J. Econ. 497, 500–02 (1997).
36. Schooner, supra note 19, at 103, 107.
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 process of purchasing what is needed.” 37 That goal—to minimize transaction 
costs in processing procurement—squares fully with Oliver Williamson’s the-
sis that economic institutions “have the main purpose and effect of economiz-
ing on transaction costs.” 38 To minimize those transaction costs, Williamson 
argues, transactions must be assigned to governance structures in a discrimi-
nating way. 39 
 Williamson’s insights—that economic institutions evolve towards transac-
tional effi ciency and to achieve that effi ciency transactions will be assigned to 
differing governance structures—have profound ramifi cations for procure-
ment, which can be assessed through the principal-agent model. 40 The obvi-
ous lesson is that principals will reshape and shift procurement functions in 
order to seek out lower transaction costs. This was certainly the case in the 
mid-1990s, when the Federal Government reduced its acquisition workforce 
dramatically and radically reduced transaction costs by streamlining procure-
ment processes. 41 Since the mid-1990s, and partly because of that reduction 
in the procurement workforce, 42 government program personnel (which we 
will treat here as the “principals” because program personnel typically want 
fi rst say in procurement decisions) have sought out alternative vehicles, often 
standing contracts sponsored by centralized purchasing agencies, to effect 
their acquisitions. 43 While these alternative vehicles may present lower nomi-
nal transaction costs for the government purchaser, they have been sharply 
37. Id. at 107 (emphasis added).
38. Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism 17 (1985).
39. Id. at 18. This explains another of Steven Schooner’s desiderata, “uniformity” in procure-
ment rules. See Schooner, supra note 19, at 109. As Schooner explains:
[T]he importance of uniformity, particularly in maximising transparency, competition, and ef-
fi ciency, among others, cannot be overstated. A uniform procurement system suggests that all 
government instrumentalities buy the same way, following the same laws, rules, and practices. 
Such a system is effi cient because sellers do not need to learn new rules in order to do business 
with different agencies or departments. Further, it is much easier to train all of the govern-
ment’s buyers, and it permits buyers greater fl exibility to work for various agencies or depart-
ments during their careers. In addition, if the government consistently uses standard provi-
sions and clauses, the process operates more smoothly. Transactions become more routine. All 
parties to the transaction understand the rules to the game.
Id. Thus, while uniformity fi rst affects transaction costs, it can have important collateral impacts on 
principal-agent relationships.
40. Notably, Williamson himself argues that, “[g]iven the complexity of the phenomena under 
review, transaction cost economics should often be used in addition to, rather than to the exclu-
sion of, alternative approaches.” Williamson, supra note 38, at 18.
41. See, e.g., Steven L. Schooner, Contractor Atrocities at Abu Ghraib: Compromised Accountability 
in a Streamlined, Outsourced Government, 16 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 549, 559–61 (2005).
42. These standing catalogue-type contracts are generally known as “indefi nite-delivery/
indefi nite-quantity” (“ID/IQ”) contracts in the United States and as “framework” agreements in 
Europe. See generally Christopher R. Yukins, Are IDIQs Ineffi cient? Sharing Lessons with European 
Framework Contracting, 37 Pub. Cont. L.J. 545 (2008).
43. See, e.g., Report of the Acquisition Advisory Panel to the Offi ce of Federal 
Procurement Policy and the United States Congress 219–72 (2007), available at https://
www.acquisition.gov/comp/aap/fi nalaapreport.html (discussing growth of interagency contract-
ing through ID/IQ contracting vehicles).
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criticized for reducing competition and transparency, and thus eroding best 
value, in government purchasing. 44 
 The less obvious, but perhaps much more deeply important, corollary of 
Williamson’s insights is that the  agent may be even more keen than the prin-
cipal to reduce transaction costs. The government  principal , after all, is more 
likely to have a broader perspective on the opportunity costs of shifting to a 
procurement method that offers lower transaction costs in the short run, but 
threatens lost value (and increased risks, for example, of corruption) in the 
long run. However the  agent —the purchasing offi cial or a surrogate—will be 
much less attuned to those broad systemic concerns and much more sensitive, 
for better or worse, to reducing transaction costs. That may, in turn, encour-
age the agent to  underinvest in negotiating any given transaction because the 
 benefi ts of careful purchasing will likely be shifted back to the principal (or, 
ultimately, the citizen/taxpayer affected by the government action), while the 
 costs of careful purchasing will be borne by the agent/purchasing offi cial or 
those to whom she answers. 45 Thus, by parsing the procurement process and 
isolating the roles of the principal and agent, we can anticipate how a drive 
for effi ciency (for lower transaction costs) can, in practice, undermine the 
system overall. 
 E. Customer Satisfaction and Best Value: The Dueling Principals 
 Schooner’s 2002 piece also spoke to “customer satisfaction” and “best 
value” as important  desiderata in procurement. 46 “Customer satisfaction” 
denotes end users’ satisfaction with the good or service acquired through 
the procurement process; “best value” means that the good or service of-
fers optimal value for price. 47 But why shouldn’t government end users be 
“satisfi ed” with “best value,” much as a normal consumer is? In reality, end 
44. See Yukins, supra note 42, at 560 n.52 (citing reports on scandals in ID/IQ contracting).
45. For a discussion of some of the costs of underinvestment, including the potential costs of 
renegotiation and breach, see Jean Tirole, Procurement and Renegotiation, 94 J. Pol. Econ. 235, 
239–40 (1986).
46. Schooner, supra note 19, at 103, 108.
47. Schooner described the two concepts as follows:
We also have increased our emphasis upon the concept of best value, or what some call value for 
money. In other words, we aspire to focus upon getting the best deal—or the best bargain—for 
the public’s money. Such an emphasis seems logical. Unfortunately, the pursuit of best value 
typically requires greater buyer resources, from market research to negotiation. Similarly, ob-
taining best value may not always please the customer (for example, if the customer requires 
premium quality regardless of price).
Also, in the 1990s, the U.S. procurement system increased its emphasis on obtaining cus-
tomer satisfaction for end users. It makes sense for buyers to try to please those for whom they 
serve. Unfortunately, pleasing end users, especially if the end user favours specifi c suppliers 
or demands that goods be provided quickly, frequently results in less competition and higher 
prices, or simply embarrassing policy decisions.
Id. at 108 (footnotes omitted).
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users are not. The soldier in the fi eld, for example, is seldom satisfi ed with 
the equipment bought as “best value”—which points out a divergence of in-
terests between stakeholders and principals. “Best value” for the taxpayer 
may mean minimizing cost to achieve good value. An end user, however—a 
pilot, for example, whose life depends on having the very best aircraft—may 
be satisfi ed only with the very highest-quality item or service, regardless of 
cost. By pointing out that customer satisfaction and best value are  different , 
Schooner highlighted a paradox in procurement, which in turn points out 
a central tension in the principal-agent model: there can, in fact, be  several 
principals, all competing for primacy to control the long chain of the pro-
curement system. 48 
 The insight that several principals may be dueling to control procure-
ment itself yields several questions. One question, discussed below, is how to 
identify and assess various principals’—here, stakeholders’—roles in shaping 
procurement. Another beguiling question is what could be done to  converge 
the principals into  one . In that hypothetical circumstance, “best value” would 
once again equate to “customer satisfaction”; logically, in other words, the 
principal who demands best value and the principal/end user who seeks “cus-
tomer satisfaction” would be one. 
 There are any number of logical pathways to convergence. 49 One is to bypass 
the procurement supply chain and to lend purchasing authority to program 
offi cials— not procurement offi cials—to allow them to purchase the goods and 
services they need directly in the open market. 50 Many of the reforms of the 
1990s 51 facilitated this approach because in practice those reforms increased 
program offi cials’ decentralized authority, outside the procurement system, to 
make purchases to meet their needs, with minimal constraints from procure-
ment rules. By decentralizing authority to determine best value, this approach 
arguably gave those program offi cials the power to bring “best value” and 
“customer satisfaction” together, in their own hands. Not surprisingly, how-
ever, because program offi cials are themselves less sensitive to costs—they 
are, after all, typically driven fi rst by program success, not low costs—this 
48. See id. For a discussion of multiple political principals, with diverse preferences, compet-
ing to control policy outcomes in defense procurement, see Mayer & Khademian, supra note 18, 
at 185.
49. One way to converge “best value” and “customer satisfaction,” as they converge for a nor-
mal consumer, is to abandon the government structure altogether and to have private individu-
als make all decisions regarding resource allocation. While that radical approach is outside this 
discussion, it does serve as an unspoken backdrop to any discussion of the procurement system: 
what if we just let the taxpayers buy the goods and services they need?
50. Line offi cials gained more authority over what to buy in part because the purchasing 
itself devolved to others, outside the procurement corps. See generally Christopher R. Yukins, 
Understanding the Current Wave of Procurement Reform—Devolution of the Contracting Function, 47 
Gov. Contractor ¶ 255, June 8, 2005 (discussing devolution of contracting function to central-
ized agencies and private fi rms).
51. See generally Steven L. Schooner, Fear of Oversight: The Fundamental Failure of Businesslike 
Government, 50 Am. U. L. Rev. 627 (2001) (discussing Clinton-era reforms).
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approach arguably contributed to higher costs and other distortions in the 
purchasing process. 52 
 Another approach is to bring much greater transparency to the procurement 
system, to empower the ultimate benefi ciaries of that procurement system—the 
veteran receiving drugs from a government contract, for example, or the rural 
community receiving a new bridge—to speak to what will be purchased on their 
behalf. This approach, which we might call “end user empowerment,” was ad-
vanced substantially through recent reforms brought by the Obama adminis-
tration. Rapid progress in information technology had already transformed the 
procurement system, making it much more transparent at every stage of the 
process. 53 When implementing the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
(the “Recovery Act”), 54 however, the Obama administration demanded even 
more transparency so that taxpayers and other stakeholders could “see”—and, 
one assumes, comment upon—how hundreds of billions of dollars in Recovery 
Act funds were being spent at every stage of the process. 55 But by sharply es-
calating transparency, Congress and the Obama administration in effect (and 
perhaps only unintentionally) shifted authority outside the normal channels of 
52. Traditional government contracting—a contract to buy a bridge, for example—was based 
on fi rm-fi xed-price contracting: the Government solicited bids for the entire project, the lowest-
price responsible bidder would be selected, and the Government could shift almost all of the 
performance and cost risks to the awardee on the fi rm-fi xed-price contract. In part so as to fa-
cilitate decentralized buying by line government offi cials, however, ID/IQ contracts (known as 
“framework agreements” in Europe and internationally) became more popular, beginning in the 
1990s. These ID/IQ contracts gained in popularity in part because they allowed program offi cials 
to purchase through different agents—the more entrepreneurial centralized purchasing agencies 
that sponsored these agreements—rather than the more rigid, traditional procurement offi ces. 
Cf., e.g., R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, Competition for Agency Contracts, 18 RAND J. 
Econ. 296 (1987) (discussing competition among agents). These ID/IQ (or “framework”) agree-
ments offer fi xed unit prices for goods and services, which may be purchased in varying quantities 
as government needs arise. Because of the disconnect between initial bidding and subsequent 
awards to meet needs as they arise, however, these “unit-price contracts” are predictably and 
inherently less effi cient. See Christian Ewerhart & Karsten Fieseler, Procurement Auctions and 
Unit-Price Contracts, 34 RAND J. Econ. 569, 570 (2003).
53. Federal business opportunities and awards are publicized through the FedBizOpps site, 
www.fbo.gov. See Fed. Bus. Opportunities, http://www.fbo.gov (last visited Aug. 7, 2010). 
Extensive data on past awards are available through the Federal Procurement Data System, 
http://www.fpds.gov (last visited Aug. 7, 2010), although data are available in a more accessible 
form through http://www.usaspending.gov (last visited Aug. 7, 2010). Other databases, such as 
the Central Contractor Registration system, provide further information on federal contracting. 
See Cent. Contractor Registration, http://www.ccr.gov (last visited Aug. 7, 2010).
54. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (“Recovery Act”), Pub. L. No. 
111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009), was signed into law on February 17, 2009.
55. An example helps to illustrate some of the new transparency brought with Recovery Act 
spending. For many years, there was no advance notice of orders under the General Services 
Administration’s Multiple Award Schedules (“MAS”), standing contracts under which billions 
of dollars of orders are made every year. Agencies would order from the MAS contracts, but 
the agencies’ requirements would not be publicized beforehand through FedBizOpps, the nor-
mal location for publicizing federal contracting opportunities over $25,000. See FAR 8.404(a); 
Yukins, supra note 42, at 562–63. Under the Recovery Act, however, information on prospective 
MAS orders to fulfi ll requirements using Recovery Act funding must be publicized through the 
FedBizOpps site, http://www.fbo.gov. See FAR 8.404(e); FAR Case 2009-10, American Recovery
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procurement (“outside the Beltway,” to use a Washington, D.C., colloquial-
ism 56 ), and vested taxpayers and users with new authority over procurement. 
By “shattering the principal” in this way—by dispersing procurement power 
away from Washington, back to taxpayers and users, to converge “best value” 
and customer satisfaction in  their hands—the Obama administration’s policies 
have shown that transparency can radically transform the way we think about 
procurement. With increased transparency, the “principal” guiding procure-
ment may no longer be the head of an agency, or even Congress—it may, in 
time, be the end users (the veteran or the rural community) who are considered 
the “principals,” with a fi rst say in how a procurement should be shaped. 
 F.  Wealth Redistribution and Risk Aversion: Understanding 
Stakeholders Through the Principal-Agent Model 
 As the discussion above refl ects, agency theory naturally highlights  stake-
holders and the role they play in procurement. The stakeholders can be re-
markably diverse, to include users, program offi cials, members of Congress, 
taxpayers, the press, and many others. While the principal-agent model makes 
the procurement system’s cures easier to understand, it also makes them more 
complicated to apply, for the model itself forces us to consider each of the 
stakeholders in a rapidly operating procurement system. Principal-agent re-
lationships constantly shift and mutate in a dynamic government system 57 —
such as a procurement system—and it is vitally important to understand the 
stakeholders and institutions at issue, their roles, and their social and political 
contexts 58 if the principal-agent problems are to be addressed appropriately. 59 
 The literature of agency theory suggests, for example, that agents as 
stakeholders may in fact manipulate the rules governing agents, not to en-
hance value for principals, but rather simply to enhance the position of the 
agents themselves. 60 This insight suggests that confl ict-of-interest rules in 
and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (the Recovery Act)—Publicizing Contract Actions, 74 Fed. Reg. 
14,636, 14,638–39 (proposed Mar. 31, 2009) (interim rule) (to be codifi ed in scattered sections 
of FAR pts. 4, 5, 8, 13, 16).
56. “The Beltway” is the familiar term for the highway that encircles Washington, D.C.
57. Waterman & Meier, supra note 2, at 197–98.
58. See, e.g., Dan Guttman, Governance by Contract: Constitutional Visions; Time for Refl ection and 
Choice, 33 Pub. Cont. L.J. 321, 342 (2004) (noting that principal-agent theorists, among others, 
have urged the “importance of understanding institutions and the practical applications of this 
understanding”).
59. For example, while normally one would want confl ict-of-interest rules in place to ensure 
that procuring offi cials (agents) did not allow personal interests to distort their purchasing deci-
sions, if in a hypothetical state a tribal chief were the principal and all the procuring offi cials/
agents belonged to his tight-knit tribe (thus reducing the chief/principal’s need for bonding and 
monitoring), it might be unnecessary to impose rigid confl ict-of-interest rules.
60. See, e.g., Michael Barzelay, The New Public Management 104 (Lee Friedman ed., 2001) 
(“Within theoretical economics, principal-agent theory centers on the structuring of incentives, 
which are presumed to be sole factor infl uencing agents’ choice among alternative effort levels 
and actions.”); S. David Young, Interest Group Politics and the Licensing of Public Accountants, 66 
Acct. Rev. 809, 817 (1991) (restrictive professional rules for accounting are more likely in states 
where interest-group strength of Certifi ed Public Accountants is high).
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public procurement, however salutary, must be drawn with a careful eye to 
 stakeholders—for example, to agents who are politically viable stakeholders—
who may manipulate the rules to enhance their own positions. 
 That special attention to the distortion that agents can cause in the pro-
curement chain helps explain another of Steven Schooner’s  desiderata , the 
phenomenon he described as “risk avoidance.” 61 An “improper obsession 
with risk avoidance can suffocate creativity,” Schooner noted, and that risk 
aversion can “stifl e innovation and render an institution ineffective.” 62 As 
Steven Kelman pointed out, because the exercise of discretion can invite ad-
verse scrutiny, contracting offi cials tend to press for taking even less risk than 
allowed by law. 63 Viewed through the prism of agency theory, this risk aver-
sion means that contracting offi cials (agents) will tend to take less than opti-
mal measures of risk in the procurement process. This in turn will lead to less 
than optimal outcomes, as there will be reduced willingness to seek out new 
vendors or innovative technologies, or to use novel procurement techniques. 
In effect, the offi cials’ caution, often driven largely by reputational concerns, 
is arguably  itself a confl ict of interest because it means that the procurement 
process will be diverted from its optimal outcomes. 64 
61. Schooner, supra note 19, at 103, 109. Indeed, Kathleen Eisenhardt argued that risk assess-
ment is a separate branch of agency theory:
Agency theory is concerned with resolving two problems that can occur in agency relation-
ships. The fi rst is the agency problem that arises when (a) the desires or goals of the principal 
and agent confl ict and (b) it is diffi cult or expensive for the principal to verify what the agent is 
actually doing. The problem here is that the principal cannot verify that the agent has behaved 
appropriately. The second is the problem of risk sharing that arises when the principal and agent have 
different attitudes toward risk. The problem here is that the principal and the agent may prefer different 
actions because of the different risk preferences.
Eisenhardt, supra note 8, at 58 (emphasis added).
62. Schooner, supra note 19, at 109. See Steven Kelman, Procurement and Public 
Management—The Fear of Discretion and the Quality of Government Performance 26 
(1990) (“Because exercise of discretion generates the congressional investigations and media sto-
ries, contracting offi cers tend to be safe rather than sorry. Given their lack of program respon-
sibility for what is procured, they have little to compensate them for taking risks.”). The World 
Bank, for example, which requires its borrowers to comply with a conservative set of procure-
ment guidelines, see Whitney Debevoise & Christopher R. Yukins, Assessing the World Bank’s 
Proposed Revision of Its Procurement Guidelines, 52 Gov’t Contractor ¶ 180, May 26, 2010, at 1, is 
highly sensitive to the reputational risk that corruption or other procurement failures could pose 
for the Bank. See, e.g., World Bank, World Bank Communications Governance and Anti-Corruption 
Strategy in Sierra Leone, http://go.worldbank.org/82JU8TFZA0 (2008) (last visited July 11, 2010) 
(discussing importance of strong anticorruption strategies in addressing reputational risk to the 
World Bank).
63. Kelman, supra note 62, at 26.
64. Agency theory also offers a solution to risk aversion in contracting offi cials. As Kathleen 
Eisenhardt pointed out in her review of the literature on agency theory, the “risk aversion of the 
agent is positively related to behavior-based contracts and negatively related to outcome-based 
contracts.” Eisenhardt, supra note 8, at 62. To apply this to procurement, read the “agent” to 
mean “procurement offi cial” and “contract” to mean the formal arrangement between the gov-
ernment and its agent, the procurement offi cial. Applying Eisenhardt’s insight, if procurement 
offi cials are judged based less on behavior (was scandal avoided?) and more on outcome (was the 
best item bought?), then the offi cials’ aversion to risk should, logically, decline.
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 The procurement process also may be distorted by another set of agents—
classes of vendors who seek, through preferences and rules, to gain a larger 
share of the Government’s procurement spending. Schooner termed this 
“ wealth distribution ,” and argued that while wealth redistribution and other 
socioeconomic goals are common hallmarks of procurement systems, 65 they 
are hardly something to be desired: 
 The author does not believe that wealth distribution is one of the procurement 
system’s primary goals. This does not suggest that the Congress does not use the 
procurement system to attempt to redistribute wealth. But those efforts are transi-
tory for the same reasons they are controversial. Two examples demonstrate the 
never-ending turbulence affecting social policies . . . . Moreover, wealth distribu-
tion is merely a subset of the larger phenomenon of burdening the procurement 
process (or, for that matter, the process of governing) with efforts to promote so-
cial policies. These social policies, in addition to those that potentially distribute 
wealth to domestic manufacturers, essential military suppliers, and small (and small 
disadvantaged and women-owned) businesses, also mandate drug-free workplaces, 
occupational safety standards, compliance with labor laws, preferences for envi-
ronmentally friendly purchasing practices, etcetera. Accordingly, while the author 
concedes that Congressional manipulation of the procurement process is a signifi -
cant aspect or feature of the system, the author cannot agree that wealth distribu-
tion is a fundamental purpose of the procurement regime. 66 
 As Schooner’s observations suggest, socioeconomic preferences, including 
wealth distribution policies, are really a function of politics, not procurement; 
as a result, agency theory, which best explains dynamics  within the procurement 
system, has little to offer to explain how those socioeconomic policies emerge. 67 
That said, agency theory  does help to explain how socioeconomic requirements 
play out once those requirements are imposed, generally by statute. 
 For example, procurement preferences that favor domestic vendors are 
routinely resisted (or outright ignored) by contracting offi cials, 68 in important 
part because implementing those preferences can substantially raise transaction 
costs for procurement offi cials—the agents implementing the preferences. 69 
In fact, while procurement offi cials may quietly applaud the socioeconomic 
goals behind a procurement preference (“saving American jobs,” for example) 
and may well tolerate the suboptimal purchasing that can result (as better or 
65. Schooner, supra note 19, at 108. See generally Christopher McCrudden, Buying Social 
Justice (2007) (comprehensive review of socioeconomic initiatives in various nations’ procure-
ment systems).
66. Schooner, supra note 19, at 108 n.28.
67. Cf. Mayer & Khademian, supra note 18, at 185 (arguing that socioeconomic goals, such 
as social justice in procurement, are put forward by one set of principals in a fi eld of competing 
principals).
68. See, e.g., Christopher R. Yukins & Steven L. Schooner, Incrementalism: Eroding the Impediments 
to a Global Public Procurement Market, 38 Geo. J. Int’l L. 529, 536–550 (2007) (recounting agency 
resistance to domestic preferences and other socioeconomic initiatives in procurement).
69. See, e.g., U.S. Gov’t Accountability Offi ce, GAO-10-383, Recovery Act: Project 
Selection and Starts Are Infl uenced by Certain Federal Requirements and Other 
Factors 9–15 (2010), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10383.pdf (labor and domestic 
preferences have slowed implementation of Recovery Act procurements).
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cheaper foreign goods and services are excluded), ultimately the higher trans-
action costs caused by socioeconomic requirements can drive an acrimonious 
wedge between procurement offi cials and their political masters. Thus, while 
agency theory may not explain how preferences come into procurement in the 
fi rst place, agency theory  does help explain the stresses that those preferences 
cause. The preferences, in turn, help highlight the very different interests and 
perspectives of the various agents in the procurement chain. 
 The distortions that can be caused by political and institutional pressures 
from competing principals, agents, and stakeholders are only some of the 
many variables that make it diffi cult to apply a rigid economic model, such as 
a “pure” principal/agent analysis, to the complexities of procurement. That 
said, the principal-agent model does provide a valuable analytical perspective 
on the stresses among the various stakeholder camps in the procurement sys-
tem, and the distortions that those camps cause to the system as a whole. 70 
 IV. USING AGENCY THEORY TO GUIDE 
CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST RULES 
 As noted, agency theory helps to explain, in broad terms, the contours 
of transparency and anticorruption rules in procurement, for agency theory 
explains why we would anticipate—and more severely punish—some agents’ 
diversions more than others. Agency theory also can be used, however, for 
more specifi c ends, such as explaining the evolution of confl ict-of-interest 
rules in the U.S. federal procurement system. 
 Those confl ict-of-interest rules, at their heart, seek to steer agents’ (of-
fi cials’) actions, through monitoring and the threat of sanctions, to align 
those actions with the goals of the governing principal (the legislature, for 
example). 71 In the U.S. federal procurement system, those confl ict-of-interest 
rules have been tightened over many years in a strengthening effort to drive 
70. Kenneth Mayer and Anne Khademian took this analysis a step further and argued that it 
was precisely because of the many competing principals—the cacophony of voices and goals, and 
the diffi culties of achieving consensus on outcomes—that defense procurement rules must focus 
instead on a rigid control of behaviors rather than outcomes. See Mayer & Khademian, supra note 
18, at 184–85.
71. Harold Petrowitz, writing in 1964, described a third, more utopian approach to confl icts 
of interest: to create a wall of separation between offi cials and confl icting economic interests. He 
wrote:
The view is commonly accepted that if the conduct of a public offi ce can suffi ciently affect 
the private economic interests of a government offi cial, his administration of the offi ce for the 
public good will inevitably be infl uenced to an unacceptable degree by this confl ict between 
obligation to the public and desire for personal profi t. The conclusion necessarily drawn then 
is that personal economic interests must be separated from the conduct of public offi ce to a 
suffi cient extent so that undue confl ict will not occur. It is the purpose of confl ict of interest 
statutes and regulations to erect the barriers needed to achieve this separation.
Harold C. Petrowitz, Confl ict of Interest in Federal Procurement, 29 Law & Contemp. Probs. 196, 
196 (1964). Since then, the rules governing confl icts of interest have taken a more nuanced 
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confl icts of interest from procurement. Bribery was the fi rst outlawed confl ict 
of interest, as it is the most “fl agrant” violation of public trust; 72 bribery trig-
gers, not coincidentally, a gross deviation from the principal’s goals 73 under 
cover of secrecy so that it is doubly diffi cult to detect and correct. 
 Bribery was fi rst outlawed in the United States in the late 18th century, and 
in the centuries since, U.S. law has gradually tightened to constrict confl icts 
of interest in public procurement. 74 Antibribery laws were strengthened in the 
1960s to improve integrity in public procurement. 75 In the wake of the “Ill 
Wind” scandals of the 1980s, the Procurement Integrity Act was passed in 
part to restrain confl icts of interest in procurement offi cials. 76 The next step, 
in the 1990s and the fi rst decade of this century, was a renewed focus on “or-
ganizational confl icts of interest,” 77 which arise when an organization (rather 
than an individual) is too confl icted by competing interests to provide sound 
direction to the Government. 78 
 Agency theory is naturally an excellent conceptual prism through which 
to assess these tightening confl ict-of-interest rules, for an agent’s potential 
confl icts of interest are, of course, at the heart of the theory. 79 Agency theory 
also explains the evolution of these confl ict-of-interest rules and suggests how 
the rules may evolve in the future. The history of confl ict-of-interest law in 
U.S. federal procurement has clearly been one of steeper sanctions, bent on 
approach. Rather than attempting to create a “barrier” between public offi cials (and their sur-
rogates) and private economic pressures, modern rules systems are more likely to acknowledge 
that those confl icting pressures will always exist and must instead be tempered by monitoring 
and, where necessary, sanctions to ensure that offi cials (and contractors working on the offi cials’ 
behalf ) are not dangerously distracted by those competing economic interests.
72. See, e.g., id. at 196–97 & 197 n.2 (citing a federal law pertaining to bribery of judges en-
acted in 1790, Rev. Stat. § 5449 (1875)).
73. As Burguet and Che explain, as the corrupt agent gains in discretion in the procurement 
process (“manipulation power,” as they described it), his corruption can profoundly affect the 
ultimate effi ciency of the procurement process. Burguet & Che, supra note 30, at 52.
74. See Petrowitz, supra note 71, at 198–200, 211–12. Petrowitz provides a historical overview 
of statutes attempting to resolve confl icts of interest of government offi cials.
75. See id. at 203–05.
76. See generally Donald P. Arnavas & Clayton S. Marsh, The Procurement Integrity Act, 9 
Briefi ng Papers Collection 453 (1991).
77. The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) defi nes organizational confl icts of interest as 
follows:
“Organizational confl ict of interest” means that because of other activities or relationships with 
other persons, a person is unable or potentially unable to render impartial assistance or advice 
to the Government, or the person’s objectivity in performing the contract work is or might be 
otherwise impaired, or a person has an unfair competitive advantage.
FAR 2.101. The term “person,” it should be noted, generally includes a corporate entity under 
U.S. law, and typically organizational confl icts of interest stem from an organization’s disabling 
confl ict, not an individual’s. See, e.g., FAR 52.203-12 (“Person means an individual, corporation, 
company, association, authority, fi rm, partnership, society, State and local government”).
78. See generally Daniel I. Gordon, Organizational Confl icts of Interest: A Growing Integrity 
Challenge, 35 Pub. Cont. L.J. 25 (2005).
79. Indeed, the U.S. Offi ce of Federal Procurement Policy (“OFPP”) specifi cally cited 
principal-agent theory when it published for public comment a draft policy letter on the limits of 
outsourcing, i.e., on how to identify those functions that should be reserved for performance by 
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deterring confl icts of interest. What has  not been fully explored, however, is 
whether agency theory’s alternative tool for mitigating confl icts of interest—
enhanced monitoring—might play a broader role in this area of the law. The 
model, as described above, posits that “monitoring” and “bonding” (sanc-
tions) can be used interchangeably, depending on transaction costs and rela-
tive effectiveness. After decades of strengthening sanctions, therefore, it may 
be time to use monitoring (more specifi cally, enhanced transparency) as an 
alternative, and less draconian, tool. 
 This shift in emphasis, to rely more on monitoring, may explain the latest 
initiative in U.S. anticorruption efforts: mandatory corporate self-disclosure. 
Under a rule that became fi nal on December 12, 2008, 80 most contractors must 
now self-disclose certain serious violations, including fraud, certain criminal 
violations from Title 18 of the U.S. Code (including bribery), and any signifi -
cant overpayments. 81 While some might view these new corporate disclosures 
as a natural outgrowth of the corporate compliance programs mandated at the 
same time, 82 another way to view these new requirements for self-disclosure 
is as part of a historical evolution towards greater control of confl icts of 
interest—here, through “monitoring” facilitated by corporate disclosures to 
the Government (backed, though, by severe threats of sanctions if the con-
tracting corporations fail to make the required disclosures). 83 It is especially 
worth noting that the rolling progress of U.S. public confl ict-of-interest rules 
has now swept up  private parties that deal with the Government. 
 The United States has taken what appears to be a novel approach in man-
dating disclosures by private contractors, 84 and that initiative may well pres-
government employees. Work Reserved for Performance by Federal Government Employees, 75 
Fed. Reg. 16,188, 16,189 (proposed Mar. 31, 2010). In the request for comments, OFPP asked 
whether “consideration should be given to establishing a ‘principal-agent’ test that would require 
agencies to identify functions as inherently governmental where serious risks could be created 
by the performance of those functions by those outside government, because of the diffi culty of 
ensuring suffi cient control over such performance[.]” Id. at 16,192.
80. FAR Case 2007-006, Contractor Business Ethics Compliance Program and Disclosure 
Requirements, 73 Fed. Reg. 67,064, 67,064 (Nov. 12, 2008) (codifi ed in FAR pts. 2, 3, 9, 42, 52).
81. Id. at 67,091. See generally Guide to the Mandatory Disclosure Rule: Issues, Guidelines and Best 
Practices, 2010 A.B.A. Sec. Pub. Cont. L. 11.
82. See FAR Case 2007-006, 73 Fed. Reg. at 67,091–92 (setting forth new contractual clause, 
FAR 52.203-13).
83. See, e.g., FAR 9.406-2 (possible debarment for failure to disclose).
84. For developments in Europe, see, for example, Self-Cleaning in Public Procurement 
Law 190–98 (Hermann Pünder et al. eds., 2009) (discussing principles governing corporate dis-
closure and remediation to avoid debarment); Keith M. Korenchuk, The UK Gets Serious About 
Overseas Corruption: The Bribery Bill and SFO Guidance, 1814 Practising L. Inst./Corp. L. 823, 
828 (2010); U.K. Ministry of Justice, Bribery Act 2010, http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/
bribery-bill.htm (new U.K. antibribery legislation will “require the Secretary of State to publish 
guidance about procedures that relevant commercial organisations can put in place to prevent 
bribery on their behalf”); Ministry of Justice, Draft Bribery Legislation, 2009, Cm. 7570, at 
11–12 (U.K.), available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/docs/draft-bribery-bill-tagged.
pdf (draft legislative package presented to Parliament called for, among other things, an affi rma-
tive defense if corporation had “adequate procedures” in place to prevent bribery, analogous to 
U.S. corporate compliance systems).
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age a broader shift to monitoring (disclosure) as a means of curbing confl icts 
of interest. If that proves true, other confl ict-of-interest rules, such as those 
addressed to organizational confl icts of interest, may be strengthened more 
through monitoring and disclosure than through sanctions. Rapid advances 
in Internet technologies drive that shift towards transparency and help to ex-
plain why monitoring through transparency probably will become a much 
more important tool in ensuring that the Government’s agents in procure-
ment do not stray because of confl icts of interest. 85 
 A heavier reliance on monitoring also will reshape how we think about 
principal-agent enforcement. While sanctions (“bonding”) depend on a narrow 
cadre of enforcement professionals (auditors, prosecutors, etc.), monitoring 
and transparency open new opportunities for other stakeholders to supervise 
the procurement process, to make sure the ends of the principal are being met 
by the various agents in the procurement supply chain. As is discussed further 
below, admitting a new and diverse group of stakeholders to serve as “moni-
tors” of agents may change the nature of who the “principal” is. 
 A fi nal note on the principal-agent model and confl icts of interest: while 
agency theory certainly helps clarify the sprawling regime of confl ict-of-
interest rules, in some ways that regime stretches beyond what principal-agent 
theory can explain and thus makes it clear that other normative structures 
must be shaping the procurement system as well. For example, although most 
such rules constrain confl icts of interest in acquisition decisions and thus fall 
squarely within the four corners of agency theory, there are other confl ict-of-
interest rules that deal with offi cials’ actions  after government employment, 86 
which do  not seem meant to protect acquisition decisions directly. If agency 
theory explains confl ict-of-interest rules that constrain  purchasing decisions, 
that theory logically  cannot explain rules that govern behavior after an offi -
cial has left her/his post and can no longer make purchases on the principal’s 
behalf. To explain these post-employment rules, therefore, either we must 
stretch the principal-agent model (sometimes beyond all recognition) 87 or we 
must consider other norms and other models to fully explain other pieces of 
an enormously complex procurement system. As is discussed below, the latter 
seems the more promising route. 
85. Broadened disclosure requirements also blur the lines between organizational and per-
sonal confl icts of interest. If, for example, a contractor will be providing sensitive assistance 
to the Government and supervising other contractors, leading the Government to require the 
contractor’s senior managers to disclose their holdings in the supervised companies, that re-
quirement arguably spans both organizational confl icts of interest (the company’s) and personal 
confl icts of interest (the managers’). Cf., e.g., FAR Case 2008-025, Preventing Potential Confl icts 
of Interest for Contractor Employees Performing Acquisition Functions, 74 Fed. Reg. 58,584, 
58,584 (proposed Nov. 13, 2009) (to be codifi ed at FAR pts. 3, 52) (proposing personal confl icts 
of interest rules regarding employees of government contractors performing acquisition-related 
functions).
86. See, e.g., FAR 3.104-3(d) (post-employment restrictions on former procurement offi cials).
87. See generally Bøhren, supra note 2.
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 V. CONCLUSION: POTENTIAL APPLICATIONS OF 
AGENCY THEORY IN PROCUREMENT 
 Agency theory, if applied rigorously, offers a versatile tool to identify and 
solve enduring puzzles in procurement law and policy, in part by breaking 
down traditional boundaries in the law. For example, agency theory could 
help dissolve the divide between the law governing the  formation and  admin-
istration of public contracts. Federal procurement law in the United States 
has traditionally divided contract formation from contract administration 
and has applied two very different rule sets to formation versus adminis-
tration. While contract  formation has centered on transparency, competi-
tion, and integrity, U.S. public contract  administration rules (fi rst cousins to 
commercial contracting rules) have tended to emphasize an effi cient alloca-
tion of risk between the public and private actors. Agency theory, a model 
that spans both formation and administration, can help integrate the two 
bodies of law by illustrating, for example, how strategic positions taken by 
agents during contract formation can play out over the course of contract 
administration. 88 
 Agency theory also can break down barriers between legal doctrines, argu-
ably artifi cial barriers that have splintered and slowed the advance of the law. 
Traditionally, for example, U.S. federal procurement law has treated  personal 
confl icts of interest (a confl ict of interest held by an individual), 89  organizational 
confl icts of interest (a disqualifying confl ict of interest held by an organization, 
typically a contractor corporation), 90 and  inherently governmental functions 
(uniquely sensitive functions that should not be outsourced to contractors) 91 
as separate and distinct. The three doctrines are addressed in separate parts of 
the Federal Acquisition Regulation, and, as of the publication of this article, 
88. See, e.g., Sudhindra Seshadri, Bidding for Contests, 41 Mgmt. Sci. 561, 561–63 (1995) 
(“Selection and control are increasingly viewed as strategically linked stages.”); see also Patrick 
Bajari & Steven Tadelis, Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts, 32 
RAND J. Econ. 387, 392–97 (2001) (using transaction cost analysis, in part to assess the shift-
ing asymmetries of information from contract formation through administration). Susan Rose-
Ackerman described how the corruption of agents—procuring offi cials—is a problem that spans 
both contract formation and administration:
Corrupt kickbacks are easy to hide in construction contracts, and the competitive nature of 
many bidding processes encourages fi rms to try to circumvent them through payoffs. In ad-
dition, once the contract is written, offi cials may seek to extract payoffs from the contractor 
and unscrupulous contractors have an incentive to pay bribes that permit them to cut corners 
to increase profi ts.
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Briefi ng: Risks of Corruption in Government Infrastructure Projects, 161 
Mun. Engineer 149, 149 (2008).
89. See, e.g., FAR 3.104-5(c)(3) (disqualifi cation of procurement offi cial due to contact with 
contractor regarding prospective employment).
90. See, e.g., FAR 9.5.
91. See, e.g., FAR 7.5; Work Reserved for Performance by Federal Government Employees, 
75 Fed. Reg. 16,188 (proposed Mar. 31, 2010) (draft policy paper regarding inherently govern-
mental tasks).
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there are at least three separate policy initiatives to address each of these doc-
trines in isolation. 92 
 Agency theory, however, suggests that all three doctrines stem from the same 
problem: ensuring that an agent (whether an individual contractor employee 
or a contractor/corporation) can be trusted to achieve the principal/sovereign’s 
ends. Viewed through the prism of the principal-agent model, the differences 
between the three doctrines seem more of degree than of kind.  Personal confl icts 
of interest , for example, are probably treated more seriously than  organizational 
confl icts of interest 93 only because a moral hazard encouraging actions that devi-
ate from the principal’s ends will be more tempting and immediate to an indi-
vidual, and the individual’s resulting deviation to further his self-interest may 
be more diffi cult to monitor (and sanction) than an organization’s. 
 Again applying agency theory, the difference between an  organizational con-
fl ict of interest and a function reserved as  inherently governmental also seems one 
of degree: there are some “inherently governmental” functions that are  per-
manently barred to contractors because of the unique authorities or resources 
controlled by those functions. 94 The Government cannot trust contractors 
to perform those functions, presumably because the contractors cannot be 
suffi ciently supervised to ensure they work in the Government’s interest and 
not in their own. Under the doctrine of organizational confl ict of interest, 
in contrast,  some contractors are barred from performing certain functions 
because they cannot be trusted to act in the Government’s interest because of 
competing corporate interests. 95 
92. See, e.g., FAR Case 2008-025, Preventing Potential Confl icts of Interest for Contractor 
Employees Performing Acquisition Functions, 74 Fed. Reg. 58,584, 58,584 (proposed Nov. 13, 
2009) (to be codifi ed at FAR pts. 3, 52) (proposing amendment to the FAR to address personal 
confl icts of interest by employees of government contractors performing acquisition-related 
functions, as required by section 841(a) of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Pub. L. No. 110-417, 122 Stat. 4356, 4537–38 (2008)); id. at 58,585 
(noting that organizational confl icts of interest are being addressed through separate rulemaking 
process, citing Notice of Advanced Rulemaking at 73 Fed. Reg. 15,961 (Mar. 26, 2008)); Work 
Reserved for Performance by Federal Government Employees, 75 Fed. Reg. at 16,188 (draft pol-
icy letter); Robert Brodsky, Coming Soon: New Guidelines on Which Federal Jobs Can Be Outsourced, 
Gov’tExec.com (Mar. 1, 2010), http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0310/030110rb1.htm (“The 
Offi ce of Management and Budget plans to release new guidance later this month that will help 
federal agencies defi ne which tasks should be performed by the government and which are suit-
able for outsourcing, according to the Obama administration’s new procurement chief.”).
93. Organizational confl icts of interest are typically addressed as contractual requirements 
under FAR Subpart 9.5, going to contractor qualifi cation. See, e.g., FAR 9.507-1. Personal 
confl icts of interest, in contrast, are often dealt with as criminal violations. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 
§ 208(a) (2006).
94. See FAR 2.101 (“ ‘Inherently governmental function’ means, as a matter of policy, 
a function that is so intimately related to the public interest as to mandate performance by 
Government employees. This defi nition is a policy determination, not a legal determination. 
An inherently governmental function includes activities that require either the exercise of dis-
cretion in applying Government authority, or the making of value judgments in making deci-
sions for the Government. Governmental functions normally fall into two categories: the act of 
governing, i.e., the discretionary exercise of Government authority, and monetary transactions 
and entitlements.”).
95. See, e.g., FAR 9.505-1.
Assessing Procurement Law Through the Principal-Agent Model 85
 The parallels between the inherently governmental functions and organi-
zational confl icts of interest doctrines are obvious, and indeed agency theory 
suggests solutions that fully span the two doctrines: better monitoring, stron-
ger sanctions, frank recognition of the moral hazards confronting the agents, 
and acknowledgment of the agents’ relative informational advantages. Linking 
the two doctrines through agency theory also means that traditional lessons 
for organizational confl icts—insisting, for example, that any prophylactic 
measures be fl exible to accommodate differences in circumstances, such as 
different demands for monitoring—can be applied equally well to inherently 
governmental functions. Agency theory, in sum, would allow policymakers to 
bring organizational confl icts and inherently governmental functions, and by 
extension personal confl icts of interest, under one theoretical roof, to avoid 
creating artifi cial doctrinal “boxes” that leave gaps in the law. 96 
 Perhaps the most important gift that agency theory can offer procurement 
law, however, is the opening it offers to  other organizational and economic 
theories, 97 to play their own parts in helping us understand the procurement 
system and its rules. 98 Auction theory, 99 bidding theory, 100 bargaining theory, 101 
 96. Agency theory also can resolve puzzling anomalies within a doctrine. In U.S. law gov-
erning contractor suspensions and debarments, for example, some debarments are left to the 
discretion of the suspending and debarring offi cial, while others are made automatic by statute. 
See, e.g., Kate M. Manuel, Cong. Research Serv., Report No. RL34753, Debarment and 
Suspension of Government Contractors: An Overview of the Law Including Recently 
Enacted and Proposed Amendments 1–11 (2008). Agency theory suggests that the system may 
have evolved in this way because while the principal (Congress) generally leaves suspension and 
debarment to agents’ (agency suspending and debarring offi cials’) discretion, there are some 
congressional policies—such as enforcement of the Clean Air Act, a basis for an automatic “statu-
tory” debarment—that might not be pursued with suffi cient vigor by agency offi cials distracted 
by a confl ict of interest, i.e., their own agencies’ procurement needs.
 97. See, e.g., Eisenhardt, supra note 8, at 63–64 (discussing how agency theory fi ts within 
other organizational theories).
 98. See, for example, the analysis offered by Alexandro M. Manelli & Daniel R. Vincent, 
Optimal Procurement Mechanisms, 63 Econometrica 591, 592 (1995), who argued that where 
buyers value marginal quality more than do sellers, sequential offers to suppliers may yield better 
results than a mere price auction. This modeling may explain why in some contexts—such as the 
purchase of highly complex engineering or consulting services—procuring agencies prefer to use 
sequential negotiations to identify and retain high-quality vendors. See also Ian Ayres & Peter 
Cramton, Defi cit Reduction Through Diversity: How Affi rmative Action at the FCC Increased Auction 
Competition, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 761 (1996) (using economic models to argue that affi rmative action 
can improve acquisition results); Anthony G. Bower, Procurement Policy and Contracting Effi ciency, 
34 Int’l Econ. Rev. 873 (1993) (using economic modeling to assess relative effi ciencies of differ-
ent contracting strategies); O. Compte et al., Corruption and Competition in Procurement Auctions, 
36 RAND J. Econ. 1, 8–9 (2005) (assessing different strategies for improving competition and 
reducing corruption in public procurement auctions, based upon economic game theory).
 99. See, e.g., Matias Eklof, Assessing Social Costs of Ineffi cient Procurement Design, 3 J. European 
Econ. Ass’n 826 (2005) (using auction theory to assess different procurement methods’ relative 
costs and benefi ts).
100. See, e.g., James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, Second Sourcing and the Experience Curve: Price 
Competition in Defense Procurement, 18 RAND J. Econ. 57 (1987) (discussing models for using 
second-sourcing to contain costs).
101. See, e.g., Guofo Tan, Optimal Procurement Mechanisms for an Informed Buyer, 29 Can. J. 
Econ. 699 (1996), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/136258.
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transaction-cost economics, 102 and other forms of economic modeling 103 have 
important roles to play in explaining the mechanics of procurement, and have 
been given far too little consideration in the legal literature. 104 As procure-
ment laws the world over continue to evolve, these various organizational and 
economic models, including agency theory, will play a vital role in helping 
us to understand, and improve, the procurement systems that play such an 
important part in the welfare of so many nations. 
102. See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, The Mechanisms of Governance 54–92 (1996) 
(chapter 3 on Transaction Cost Economics); Bajari & Tadelis, supra note 88; John D. Huber & 
Charles R. Shipan, The Costs of Control: Legislators, Agencies, and Transaction Costs, 25 Legis. 
Stud. Q. 25 (2000), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/440392.
103. See, e.g., David P. Baron & David Besanko, Monitoring, Moral Hazard, Asymmetric 
Information, and Risk Sharing in Procurement Contracting, 18 RAND J. Econ. 509 (1987); Morton 
Bennedsen & Christian Schultz, Adaptive Contracting: The Trial-and-Error Approach to Outsourcing, 
25 Econ. Theory 35 (2005) (pilot outsourcing contracts with incomplete terms allow principal/
Government to assess strategies for broader outsourcing); Steven D. Levitt, Optimal Incentive 
Schemes When Only the Agents’ “Best” Output Matters to the Principal, 26 RAND J. Econ. 744 
(1995) (discussing optimal structure where principal cares about the agent’s output only if it is the 
“best,” e.g., the world’s leading weapons system); Steven D. Levitt & Christopher M. Snyder, Is 
No News Bad News? Information Transmission and the Role of “Early Warning” in the Principal-Agent 
Model, 28 RAND J. Econ. 641 (1997) (discussing optimal structures to ensure that agent shares 
information with principal); Sudhindra Seshardi et al., Multiple Source Procurement Competitions, 
10 Mktg. Sci. 246, 246–47 (1991) (using economic models to assess costs and benefi ts of multiple 
awards).
104. Mayer & Khademian, supra note 18, at 184, argued that defense procurement must be 
understood within the broader context of organizational and political theory. Otherwise it will be 
too easy to lose sight of the inherent dangers in procurement—agents’ and institutions’ inherent 
confl icts of interest, for instance—and to rush headlong to liberalize rules. Id. (“By simply advo-
cating that procurement be deregulated for the sake of effi ciency, reformers ignore the central 
management challenges of ensuring accountability and the inevitable disputes among competing 
principals over goal defi nition and outcome evaluation.”).
